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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to assess if inflation targeting post-communist economies performed 
better, in terms of output growth, during the crisis than their non-inflation targeting counterparts. The 
paper also puts the issue in the context of the preconditions of inflation targeters to adopt this regime. 
26 post-communist economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States are analyzed during the ongoing economic crisis. Results suggest that inflation targeters of 
those countries performed worse than non-inflation targeters. The growth decline in inflation targeters 
post-communist economies has been estimated to be deeper by about four percentage points than that 
in non-inflation targeters. The study finds very limited role of the preconditions for growth decline. 
Only the lower amount of monetary financing of the budget may have contributed in inflation-
targeting countries to have gone through the crisis better. 
 
Keywords: inflation targeting, pre-conditions for adoption, post-communist economies 
JEL classification: E42, E52 
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1. Introduction 
Since its “invention” in the early 1990s, inflation targeting (IT) sparked a tremendous body of 
research. The studies evaluating macroeconomic performance under this monetary regime (see, for 
instance, Siklos, 1999; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; Kuttner and Posen, 2001; Corbo et al. 
2002; Neumann and von Hagen, 2002; see also Angeriz and Arestis, 2007, for a summary) generally 
conclude that after IT was introduced inflation and its persistence fell. The results on output volatility 
remained mixed, thus not giving support for the claim that IT is a superior strategy. However, these 
studies also found that IT countries did not perform better than non-ITers with a similar starting point 
(mostly taken as an equal initial level of inflation). Consequently, much of the extant evidence fails to 
address the argument put forth in Friedman (2003) and Ball and Sheridan (2005) that most central 
banks, not just inflation targeters, enjoyed better outcomes in recent years. One reason for this is that 
the widespread adoption of IT happened to coincide with a period with a stable economic 
environment, “a period friendly to price stability” (Neumann and von Hagen, 2002, p. 129) and mild 
macroeconomic shocks. Hence, while IT proponents (Bernanke et al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2001) 
strongly argued in IT’s favor, IT opponents (Stiglitz, 2008; Frankel, 2012), including the FED and the 
ECB, continue to show skepticism towards its adoption.  
The research on IT in developing, including post-communist economies is not an exception of 
the general conclusion that inflation targeters performed well, but not better than non-inflation 
targeters (Corbo et al. 2001; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; 2006; 2007 IMF, 2005; Edwards, 
2007; Conçalves and Salles, 2008; Carvalho Filho, 2010; Petreski, 2011). However, over and above 
this discussion, the conduct of monetary policy in developing and post-communist economies faces 
several challenges. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) highlight the weak institutional environment in the 
post-communist economies: they did not have a strong record of low inflation and this could have 
been detrimental for successful IT. Mishkin (2004); Fraga et al. (2004) and Aizenman et al. (2011) 
further question the following characteristics of the post-communist process: i) the capacity of fiscal, 
financial and monetary institutions, including the increased probability that authorities will pursue 
short-run objectives without regard to the long-run damage; ii) financial and fiscal dominance; iii) the 
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exposure to shocks and cash-inflows vulnerability of those countries as small, open economies; and 
iv) the problem of high euroization. Hence, IT performance in post-communist economies has been 
likely shaped by those aspects as well. 
Notwithstanding the ongoing debates about merits of inflation targeting, it is a stylized fact 
and even a warning of the pre-crisis literature (Kuttner, 2004) that it had not been tested by a situation 
involving large macroeconomic shock until the 2007 economic crisis came by. Until the present 
moment, no IT regime failed, but the question if it helped mitigating the perils of the crisis persists 
(e.g. Carvalho Filho, 2010). This paper opts to investigate if inflation targeting post-communist 
economies performed better in terms of their output growth, than their non-inflation targeting 
counterparts during the crisis, with special reference to their preparedness and capability to conduct 
this monetary framework.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the underlying literature on IT and 
presents some stylized facts about IT in post-communist economies. Section 3 puts the emphasis on 
the preconditions to adopt IT in post-communist economies. Section 4 presents the model, 
methodology and data used. Section 5 presents the results and offers a discussion. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Inflation targeting at the crossroads 
Inflation targeting (IT) was first introduced by New Zealand in 1990 and then followed by 
many developed and developing countries. Hence, many studies emerged on many aspects of IT. IT 
proponents, like Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin (2006) and Svensson (1996, 1999a,b) portrayed it as 
a flexible monetary framework enabling central banks to pursue countercyclical monetary policy 
while maintaining medium- and long-run price stability. Indeed, the years under IT have been quite 
favorable: inflation and its persistence fell, while results on output volatility have not been worse 
(Siklos, 1999). 
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However, IT had its skeptics even from the beginning. One longstanding question is if this 
policy strategy could actually matter for outcomes as much as, and in the way that, its advocates said 
it should. For instance, a strand of the literature (Neumann and von Hagen, 2002; Friedman, 2003 and 
Ball and Sheridan, 2005) expressed doubts that merely declaring a numerical inflation target, while 
reserving the right to respond to shocks, would offer any tangible advantage over conventional 
discretionary frameworks. The second question is whether IT’s touted advantages would come at the 
cost of greater output instability, due to stricter adherence to a rigid policy rule (Kuttner and Posen, 
2011). In other words, the concern was over the credibility-flexibility dilemma: how IT could be 
constraining enough to have an effect, and yet flexible enough to allow for meaningful output 
stabilization (Kohn, 2003; Meyer, 2004; Friedman and Kuttner, 1996). At the empirical front, 
literature failed to address the argument put forth in Friedman (2003) and Ball and Sheridan (2005) 
that most central banks, not just inflation targeters, enjoyed better outcomes in recent years. 
Throughout most of the period since IT was widely adopted, global macroeconomic conditions have 
been relatively benign compared with earlier periods. As a result, there is only limited evidence on the 
robustness of IT regimes to major shocks, as the ongoing global economic crisis. 
The crisis sparked a fundamental rethinking of the basic economic tenets (Mishkin, 2011). In 
that, inflation targeting was punched by extreme considerations. On the one extreme, literature argues 
that IT coped with the crisis better than other monetary frameworks. For instance, Fouejieu (2012) 
provides some arguments and preliminary evidence that IT economies underwent the crisis better due 
to some inherent features of the framework itself: IT enables favorable fiscal stance, monetary-policy 
credibility and low volatility of the exchange rate, which are all credits for better economic 
management during crisis. Roger (2009) also tentatively assesses the performance of IT during the 
crisis and concludes that IT economies somehow better coped with the crisis, both in terms of the 
level and volatility of the macroeconomic outcomes. On the other extreme, though, prominent 
economists argue that the crisis marked the end of IT: “Inflation targeting is being put to the test – and 
it will almost certainly fail” (Stiglitz, 2008); “It is with regret that we announce the death of inflation 
targeting. The monetary-policy regime, known as IT to friends, evidently passed away in September 
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2008.” (Frankel, 2012). The former argues that IT cannot cope with imported inflation in developing 
economies, as rising interest rates will suffocate aggregate demand, but will not curb inflation. The 
latter, in addition, blames IT for not having considered asset bubbles enough in the policymaking, 
which in turn ignited the crisis. Fairly, though, neither an inflation targeter left the framework so far, 
nor critical empirical evidence has yet been provided that (why) IT performed so good or so bad; let 
alone evidence on developing and post-communist economies. 
Figure 1 presents some measures for central tendency and variability of growth and growth 
decline during crisis in IT
1
 and non-IT post-communist economies of Central and South East Europe 
(CESEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The figure makes a distinction 
between the observed growth over the crisis period and growth decline over the same period when 
compared to a period of roughly one economic cycle (2006-2012). Therefore, for the ‘growth decline’ 
parts of the graph, negative figures would mean that the growth during the crisis has been lower than 
the average over the business cycle (2006-2012) and vice versa. The median is given by the thick bar 
so as to make it distinctive from the quartiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 These are nine countries from the two regions of post-communist economies which have so far adopted 
inflation targeting: Albania, Armenia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Serbia. 
The remaining countries of our sample are labeled as non-IT countries. 
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Figure 1 – Growth performance during crisis (2009-2012) under inflation targeting versus non-
inflation targeting in post-communist economies 
 
Source: Drafted by the author, based on IMF data 
Judging according to the median, inflation targeters did not perform worse than non-inflation 
targeters, neither in terms of crisis growth nor in terms of crisis growth decline. However, observing 
the median only may lead to a wrong conclusion. Looking at the range and the inter-quartile range, 
important conclusions emerges: i) the range of the growth decline under IT is narrower and lower than 
under non-IT; ii) the inter-quartile range for the IT series is narrower than that of non-IT series; and 
iii) the fourth quartile of the IT series is very narrow and the maximum growth decline is about 4%, 
while of the non-IT series is very large and the maximum growth decline is nearly 15% (i.e. 3 to 4 
times higher than that of IT). All these observations suggest that while the median growth and growth 
decline during the crisis have been almost the same for both IT and non-IT post-communist 
economies; the distribution of the IT series is heavily skewed on the downside. Together with the 
qualms in the literature, we pursue this stylized fact for further investigation in this paper. 
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3. Preconditions for IT in post-communist economies  
There is consensus in the literature that five pre-conditions are important to be sufficiently 
fulfilled when a country, particularly developing country, considers adopting inflation targeting. A 
summary of these is given, for instance in Mishra and Mishra (2009), as follows: 
 Central bank independence from the government; 
 Absence of fiscal dominance, i.e. a monetary financing of budget deficit; 
 Sufficiently developed financial system and monetary transmission effectiveness; 
 Low currency substitution and liability dollarization; 
 Absence of or low external dominance, i.e. external shocks. 
The central bank must be given a clear mandate for price stability (Hennan et al. 2006). The 
credibility of IT is likely to be enhanced by a high degree of central-bank independence from the 
government in its policy formulation. In that regard, the central bank has to have at its disposal a 
variety of instruments necessary for achieving the inflation target. However, the central bank must not 
be left alone in explaining to the public the chosen strategy for monetary policy: there must be a joint 
responsibility for setting of the inflation target (Siklos and Abel, 2002).  
Masson et al. (1997) argue that monetary policy must not be subordinated to any other 
economic policy, primarily fiscal policy. Whereas there is no qualm that the fiscal stance should be 
strong (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003), implying fiscal deficits and debt levels supportive to the inflation 
target, the conduct of the monetary policy must not be dictated to or severely constrained by 
developments of a fiscal nature. The case against fiscal dominance requires that the government has a 
sufficiently broad tax base and that, therefore, there is no incentive to systematically rely on 
seigniorage. Under IT, public sector borrowing from the central bank should be minimized or non-
existent (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003). Moreover, this implies that a financial market for government 
securities should be developed in order to absorb the issuance of government debt. Recall that Sargent 
and Wallace (1982) argue that the accumulation of debt should be at a pace that guarantees its 
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sustainability. Even if the government does not borrow from the central bank, the fiscal theory of the 
price level suggests that such irresponsible behaviour of the government will lead to inflation with a 
fiscal origin. Then, the fiscally-driven inflation process will gradually undermine the effectiveness of 
the monetary policy to attain any nominal target, including the inflation target. In such a scenario, 
fiscal policy dominates and monetary policy accommodates - a situation which is inconsistent with an 
IT framework. 
Not only the government-securities market should be developed, but all segments of the 
financial and banking sector should be developed to a level sufficient to provide an efficient 
transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Moreover, as IT is not accompanied by any target for 
the exchange rate, economic agents will be better off if there are hedging instruments against 
exchange-rate risk. Hedging gains in importance when the level of euroization of the economy is 
considerable. The exchange-rate risk arises because of the currency mismatch in economic agents’ 
balance sheets in euroized economies. The flexible exchange rate under IT would create greater 
exchange-rate exposure to economic agents in a euroized economy. A developed foreign exchange 
market would mitigate this exposure. In a world of increased capital mobility, therefore, an optimal 
combination of the level of euroization and the development of the financial market is desirable for 
successful IT (Masson et al. 1997). Finally, Mishra and Mishra (2009) explain that external shocks 
hitting the economy may play a role for successful IT in developing economies. External shocks may 
result in large volatility of the exchange rate, inflation and interest rate. Large external shocks that 
generate instability in the economy may in turn jeopardize the fulfillment of the inflation target. 
Despite the consensus in the IT literature around the pre-conditions that need to be met for 
successful IT in developing economies, the argumentation of Mishkin (2004) cannot be overlooked. 
He argues: “…although fiscal and financial stability are necessary conditions for inflation control, I 
think the view that these reforms are prerequisites for attempting an inflation targeting regime in 
emerging market countries is too strong … If an inflation targeting regime is to be sustainable, a 
commitment to and work on these reforms is required when inflation targeting is implemented.” 
(p.120). One should also not forget that some developing countries embarked on IT after turbulence 
8 
 
on the foreign exchange market, i.e. after the peg became unsustainable (for instance, the Czech 
Republic; for more details see Petreski, 2011). Hence, they were not at that point in time quite 
concerned in satisfying these preconditions, but likely invested in their fulfillment later so as to enable 
smoother conduct of monetary policy under IT. 
Figures 2 to 5 offer some insight into preconditions for the nine IT post-communist 
economies of CESEE and CIS who adopted this monetary strategy so far. Figure 2 shows that 
countries already had very low levels of monetary financing of the budget (frequently at one-digit 
level), but even if they did not, they were able to reduce it by the time and after IT adoption (the solid 
line above the dashed line). For instance, Albania and Georgia, both with the highest amounts of 
monetary financing of the budget in the sample of IT post-communist economies, were able to reduce 
it by 28% and 44%, respectively, between 2009 (the year of adoption) and 2011, hence likely showing 
commitment to mitigate this risk for the IT operation as fast as possible. Also, Figure 3 suggests that 
monetary transmission effectiveness continued to improve between 2003 and 2011 for those countries 
who adopted IT before 2003, while improvement is also observable, although at a lower scale, for 
those who made the adoption after 2003 (the solid line below the dashed line). 
Figure 2 – Monetary financing of the budget Figure 3 – Monetary transmission 
  
 Source: Drafted by the author, based on IMF data 
Note: AL – Albania, AM – Armenia, CZ – Czech, HU – Hungary, PL – Poland, RO – Romania, RU – 
Russia, RS - Serbia 
However, Figures 4 and 5 do not give such a clear-cur conclusion. Figure 4 looks at the level 
of euroization. It suggests that over the observed period, there is worsening in some countries which 
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early adopted IT (like Poland and Hungary); while in some later adopters (like Armenia and Georgia), 
the improvement is apparent, but the level of foreign currency deposits remains very high. Similarly, 
Figure 5 points out to the present ‘external dominance’: while the solid line (2004) is calmer, the 
dashed one (2010) suggests that in many IT adopters, this criterion quite worsened. It is expected, 
though, this to be the case, amid the global crisis, but this still suggests that IT adopters did not work 
on the plan to reduce their external-shock exposure (like, diversification – geographical and industrial 
– of their export and capital flows). 
Figure 4 – Euroization Figure 5 – External exposure 
  
Source: Drafted by the author, based on IMF data 
Note: AL – Albania, AM – Armenia, CZ – Czech, HU – Hungary, PL – Poland, RO – Romania, RU – 
Russia, RS - Serbia 
Overall, while there is weak evidence of fulfillment of IT preconditions before IT adoption in 
post-communist economies, there is some satisfactory evidence that countries worked to improve 
some of the criteria – hence, supporting Mishkin’s (2004) stance – but, the results on euroization and 
external-shock exposure are feeble and in some way repealed. To find out if these stylized facts 
somehow affected IT performance during the crisis in post-communist economies is one of the 
objectives of this study, which we pursue in the next section. 
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4. Model, methodology and data 
4.1. Economic model and methodology 
In order to examine if inflation targeting post-communist economies performed better, in 
terms of growth, than their non-inflation targeting counterparts over the crisis, we first need a measure 
of their growth performance during the crisis. In order to measure how much they were affected by the 
crisis, we propose a measure of the short-run output growth being a difference between the growth in 
the respective quarter of the crisis period, minus the average growth rate over 2006-2012. In particular 
for the latter, growth is averaged over both expansion and contraction over fairly short period of time 
and should be a satisfactory representation of the long-run growth. Defined in this way, the variable 
wipes out the unobserved country heterogeneity, i.e. factors such as schooling or investment which 
are contained in a standard growth regression and affect the long-run path of the growth (see, e.g. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). So, what remains in the above-specified variable is indeed the “short 
run”. However, inflation targeting itself cannot explain growth performance, i.e. once growth is 
‘demeaned’, the remaining variability can be attributed to certain developments in the economy. 
As suggested by the literature, the first group of developments is policy moves which would 
reflect the `capacity` of the economy to handle disturbances. “Employment and output fluctuations 
inevitably relate to shocks and to the manner in which the economy copes with … shocks” (Easterly 
et al. 2001, p.8). Changes in money, interest rate, fiscal stance or changes in the terms of trade as a 
result of external factors would impinge on the short-run output movements.  
The second group of variables represents buffers against the shocks. Kose et al. (2005) and 
Easterly et al. (2001), for instance, suggest including GDP per capita, trade openness, an indicator of 
financial deepness, price volatility and an indicator of political instability. Mobarack (2001) suggests 
taking an even broader list of variables, among which the Gini coefficient, tax revenues, real-
exchange-rate volatility, credit to the private sector and war participation. Easterly and Kraay (2000) 
argue in favor of the trade and financial openness to reflect the extent of integration of the economy 
into global trade and capital markets. However, they point out that the level of financial development 
may matter little if firms in the country have easy access to credit abroad. Hence, a high degree of 
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international trade and financial integration could also play a buffer role and smooth large output 
drop. However, while high degrees of openness of the capital account could serve to smooth the 
adjustment of a country to a shock, it may also expose it to another adverse source of dynamic 
reaction and, in essence, may measure the economy’s vulnerability to an external shock. Investors, 
observing the weakening condition of firms and financial institutions within the country in response to 
a shock, may decide to pull their (short-term) money out of the country and put it elsewhere, thus 
further weakening both firms and financial institutions (e.g. by further weakening the currency) and 
possibly inducing a crisis. A negative shock to the capital account will have adverse effects on the 
terms at which firms can get access to funds and may be exacerbated by the presence of credit 
rationing. The increased uncertainty about different firms’ balance sheets, caused by the economic 
disturbance, may lead to a greater prevalence of credit rationing and to further contractions in 
demand, as firms attempt to increase their liquidity. 
A third group suggests inflation and wage growth as determinants of short-run growth to 
account for the traditional explanation of output fluctuations by downward nominal rigidities 
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982). Namely, rigid real wages provided an easy explanation of 
unemployment — a decrease in the demand for labour immediately turns into unemployment (lower 
output), because real wages are rigid and fail to equilibrate the market. The reduction in the demand 
for labour could be explained by the falling demand for goods, in itself explained by rigidities in 
intertemporal prices. 
To this set of variables explaining the short-run growth, we will add an indicator of if a 
country is an inflation targeter or not. Hence, the regression to be estimated is as follows: 
                                                                         
                                         (1) 
Where:             is GDP growth in country i in period t minus the average GDP growth over 
2006:Q1-2012:Q1;          is the annual growth of M2;       is the reference interest rate of the 
central bank, both variables capturing the actions of the monetary policy;        is the growth of the 
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government consumption, reflecting the stance of the fiscal policy;         is the growth of the real 
effective exchange rate, reflecting external factors;       and          are the trade and capital flows as 
a percentage of GDP, respectively, to capture the trade and financial openness as reflections of 
external vulnerability or integration;           is the total domestic credit as a percent of GDP, to 
reflect the financial deepness as a shield;        is price growth to reflect nominal rigidities; and       is 
a dummy variable taking a value of one if the country has been an inflation targeter during the crisis 
and zero otherwise.    is a country-specific error term;      is the idiosyncratic error which is assumed 
to be well behaved. Our main interest is the parameter   ; if inflation targeters performed better 
during the crisis due to having this framework in operation, this coefficient would be significant and 
positive. 
 To check if more prepared inflation targeting central banks performed better than those which 
were less prepared, (1) will be supplemented by the interactions of       with variables reflecting the 
preconditions to embark on an inflation targeting in post-communist economies, discussed in Section 
3: 
                                                                         
                                                                        
                                       (2) 
Where the added variables are as follows:           is the amount of central bank claims to the 
government in M2, as a measure of the monetary financing of the budget;          is an indicator of 
the effectiveness of the monetary transmission, ranging from 1 to 5 where 5 is very effective 
transmission and interest rates fully liberalized;              is the volatility of the real effective 
exchange rate growth, as a measure of frequency and magnitude of external shocks; and         is the 
foreign liabilities of the banking sector in M2, as a measure of the degree of currency substitution. A 
variable measuring the central bank independence is not included, due to: lack of unified index for the 
countries investigated; due to not having quarterly data; and due to the very low variability even of the 
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annual series. The coefficients from    to    would reveal if inflation targeters which entered inflation 
targeting more prepared, went through the crisis less harmed. 
An econometric challenge in estimating (1) and (2) is that of reverse causality – growth can 
affect some of the explanatory variables, as well. For instance, if policy reaction and growth are 
measured contemporaneously, positive coefficient on the policy variable can be obtained because 
policy really affects growth positively, but also because higher growth allows for more supportive 
policy. Reverse causality can lead to wrong inference. If reverse causality is not problematic, then 
equations (1) and (2) can be consistently estimated with an OLS. However, reverse causality cannot 
be rejected on theoretical grounds, i.e. we can be on the safe side if we take it into consideration in the 
model. Therefore, besides the OLS estimation, we would consider FE and RE specifications wherein 
the unobserved individual heterogeneity is included and IV specifications where past values of the 
suspected variables for endogeneity are used as instruments to correct for it. With regard to the added 
variables in equation (2), these are dated back for four quarters. This has an intuitive explanation: 
since these variables stand for the pre-conditions for pursuing inflation targeting, they need to capture 
the setup earlier than the investigated period. Hence, these will not be instrumented, as the dating-
back resolves the potential endogeneity problem. 
 
4.2. Data 
The models set in the previous section will be estimated for 26 post-communist economies of 
CESEE
2
 and CIS
3
. The referent period is 2009:Q1-2012:Q1. The first quarter of 2009 is taken as the 
quarter when crisis hit those economies, since all of them firstly recorded negligent or negative 
growth in this quarter, as well because some econometric investigations (Jovanovic and Petreski, 
2012) empirically document this quarter as the onset of the crisis. Therefore, the dependent variable is 
defined as the growth rate in quarter i minus the average growth rate between 2006:Q1 and 2012:Q1. 
                                                             
2 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine. 
14 
 
This has an intuitive explanation as well, since the years 2006-2008 were the best years for many 
post-communist economies before the crisis hit, while 2009-2012 as crisis years, so as a full business 
cycle is covered.  
Since we will operate with relatively large number of explanatory variables, an important 
problem that may arise is that of multicolinearity. Therefore, Table 1 checks for the correlation 
between variables; it points out to low to moderate correlation between all pairs of variables, except 
between the trade and capital flows, which is considered to be high. However, in general, estimations 
should not suffer multicolinearity. 
Table 1 – Correlation matrix 
  Real 
money 
growth 
Real 
growth of 
gov’t con. 
Interest 
rates 
Change 
in REER 
Credit to 
GDP Inflation 
Trade to 
GDP 
Capital 
flows to 
GDP 
Real money 
growth 
1               
Real growth of 
gov’t con. 
0.2637 1             
Interest rates -0.2488 0.0376 1           
Change in 
REER 
0.4397 0.0979 0.0331 1         
Credit to GDP -0.1851 -0.2397 0.0978 -0.1021 1       
Inflation 0.0272 -0.0132 0.1665 0.1254 -0.0687 1     
Trade to GDP -0.0357 -0.0959 0.3629 -0.0300 -0.0073 -0.0492 1   
Capital flows to 
GDP 
-0.0020 -0.1345 0.2185 -0.0564 -0.0399 -0.1229 0.8153 1 
Source: Drafted by the author, based on the data from IMF. 
 
The main source of the data is the databases of the International Monetary Fund. The index on 
the effectiveness on the monetary transmission is approximated by the bank reform and interest-rate 
liberalization index from the Transition Indicators of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. The list of central banks inflation targeters in CESEE and CIS is based on Hammond 
(2009) and the update on www.centralbanknews.info, and is as follows: Albania, Armenia, Czech 
Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Serbia. 
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5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Growth during crisis under inflation targeting 
Results of the baseline specification (1) are given in Table 2. The table has five columns. It 
starts with a simple OLS which does not consider the individual heterogeneity into account. The next 
two columns (2 and 3) present the results of a fixed and random effects estimators, respectively, both 
accounting for the individual heterogeneity. As we argued earlier, the OLS approach may be justified 
in our case, since the dependent variable is ‘demeaned’, i.e. individual countries characteristics are 
wiped out by subtracting the average growth rate between 2006 and 2012 from each growth 
observation. We also argued that OLS and FE/RE estimators may give credible estimates should the 
problem of reverse causality is not assumed to exist or has been resolved by taking past values as 
explanatory variables.  
However, in our case, we can argue that growth affect policy as much as policy affects 
growth. From that viewpoint, hence the results in the first three columns of Table 2 may be wrongly 
estimated due to the potential presence of the problem of endogeneity. Therefore, columns (4) and (5) 
make use of an instrumental variables approach, which uses past values of the potentially endogenous 
variables as instruments to correct for the potential endogeneity. Note that column (4) gives the IV 
fixed effects, while (5) IV random effects estimator. In the bottom of the table, the Hansen test 
suggests that the instruments used are valid. Also, the Hausman test is given to make a statistical 
suggestion of which, FE or RE, is preferred. In the case of the non-IV estimators, the test suggests that 
FE is preferred, but when it comes to IV, RE is preferred. Though, an FE estimator does not fit our 
purpose since our main variable of interest – the dummy that takes value of one if a country is an 
inflation targeter over the crisis – is a kind of a fixed effect and would be hence wiped out. On the 
other hand, having the IV-FE estimates affords us to calculate the p-value of the endogeneity test (in 
the bottom of the table), which suggests that the suspected variables for endogeneity could be actually 
treated as exogenous. 
Fortunately, a factor that goes against the dissonant discussion above is the considerable 
robustness of the obtained coefficients across the specifications presented in Table 2. Therefore, in 
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analyzing the obtained coefficients, we propose to focus on column (5), despite the suggestions of the 
endogeneity test. We do so, since this is only a statistical test, while the critics from the literature that 
there is a reverse causality between growth and policy are well articulated (see, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004; Mankiw et al. 1992; Fischer, 1993; Levine and Renelt, 1992; and others). 
Table 2 – Baseline results 
Dependent variable: Current 
growth minus average 2006:Q1-
2012:Q1 
OLS FE RE IV-FE IV-RE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real money growth 0.293*** 0.303*** 0.293*** 0.285*** 0.273*** 
Interest rate -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Change in the real effective 
exchange rate 
0.086 0.079 0.088 0.089 0.096 
Real growth of government 
consumption 
0.143 0.121 0.143 0.215 0.192 
Trade openness 0.252** 0.496* 0.252** 0.465*** 0.234*** 
Capital flows to GDP -6.324 -1.095 -6.324 3.159 -0.709 
Credit to GDP 0.060** 0.052* 0.060 0.102** 0.103*** 
Inflation 0.391* 0.359 0.391* 0.343 0.424 
Constant -0.041 -0.088 -0.041* - -0.007 
      
Inflation targeting -0.033*** - -0.033*** - -0.044*** 
      
R squared 0.8163 0.6276 0.8163 0.7760 0.7737 
F-statistics 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No of observations 48 48 48 48 48 
Hausman Test (p-val) 
H0: FE is preferred 
- 
0.9678 0.0017 
Hansen test (p-val) 
H0: Instruments are valid 
- - - 0.3029 0.2507 
Endogeneity test (p-val) 
H0: Variables can be treated as 
exogenous 
- - - 0.7509 - 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-age level, respectively. 
 
 Results for the real money growth suggest that if it increases by 10 percentage points (going 
from the first to the third quartile), it reduces growth decline during crisis by 2.7 percentage points 
(p.p.), on average, ceteris paribus. If the interest rate declines by about 7 p.p. (going from the first to 
the third quartile), crisis growth would be saved by 6.3 p.p., on average. These two variables confirm 
the power of the monetary policy to affect short-run growth and prevent the economy being dragged 
into deeper recession. The real effective exchange rate is found insignificant, which may be due to the 
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presence of domestic inflation already in the equation, but more probably due to the relative 
invariability of the nominal exchange rate in a significant part the investigated countries. Surprisingly, 
though, fiscal policy is found ineffective in stimulating recovery or preventing recession. Trade 
openness is found significant and positively affecting crisis growth, which suggests that it acts as a 
buffer rather than as exposure factor for those countries. Indeed, the post-communist economies 
investigated here are all small and open
4
, whereby international trade is the main driving force of the 
domestic GDP. Therefore, even slight changes in external demand significantly affect domestic 
growth. Similarly, credit in GDP, as an indicator of the financial deepness, suggests that the higher the 
financial intermediation in crisis, the more output decline is saved: additional 18 p.p. increase of 
credit in GDP (going from the first to the third quartile), would prevent output decline by 2 percentage 
points. Capital flows to GDP, reflecting the external exposure, and inflation, reflecting nominal 
rigidities, are not significant. 
 Out main variable of interest – if the country has been an inflation targeter or not over the 
crisis – is statistically significant and economically meaningful. It suggests that post-communist 
countries which had inflation targeting as their monetary strategy, during the crisis performed worse 
than non-inflation targeters, by about 4.4 percentage points, on average, ceteris paribus. This may be 
surprising result, as some tentative evidence (Section 2) argued in favor of inflation targeting during 
the crisis. On the other hand, despite the afforded flexibility under IT, it may be that the warning of 
Stiglitz (2008) and Frankel (2012) is just right: the narrow focus of IT on inflation in the ‘good’ years 
may have blinded central bankers from other worthwhile objectives such as reducing unemployment, 
hence resulting in larger decline of output than in a non-IT economy. Indeed, although IT did not 
literally fail during the crisis, results suggest that it coped with the crisis worse than the non-IT 
countries. “The weaker economy and higher unemployment that inflation targeting brings won’t have 
much impact on inflation; it will only make the task of surviving in these conditions more difficult.” 
(Stiglitz, 2008, p.1). Our findings give preliminary support to this statement and are in line with the 
observed stylized fact on Figure 1 that inflation targeters went shoddier through the crisis. If we 
                                                             
4 Although this cannot be quite claimed for Russia and Poland, they still exert considerable openness and, from 
that viewpoint, do not differentiate from a typical small and open economy. 
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consider that almost all of the non-IT countries in the sample have a form of a hard peg (currency 
board or monetary union), then it appears that in non-normal times, IT performed worse than hard 
pegs, with regard to the growth performance of the economy. 
 Results are further confirmed for their robustness in Table 3, where variables are added group 
by group. A notable change is that the real exchange rate loses its significance once inflation enters 
the regression, which was our concern above. Therefore, we may conclude that the real exchange rate 
also exerts some influence on the crisis growth. Real depreciation of additional 8 p.p. (going from the 
first to the third quartile), results in growth decline saved by about 0.7 p.p. 
Table 3 – Checking robustness to variables exclusion (IV-RE) 
Dependent variable: Current 
growth minus average 2006:Q1-
2012:Q1 
‘Monetary’ 
variables 
only 
‘Fiscal’ 
variable 
added 
‘Exposure’ 
variables 
added 
‘Buffer’ 
variable 
added 
All 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real money growth 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.309*** 0.293*** 0.273*** 
Interest rate -0.004*** -0.004* -0.003* -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Change in the real effective 
exchange rate 
0.154*** 0.151*** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.096 
Real growth of government 
consumption 
- 0.025 0.004 0.093 0.192 
Trade openness - - 0.181 0.189 0.234 
Capital flows to GDP - - -9.451 -3.387 -0.709 
Credit to GDP - - - 0.095** 0.103*** 
Inflation - - - - 0.424 
Constant 0.002 -0.001 -0.010 0.018 -0.007 
      
Inflation targeting -0.028*** -0.028** -0.029** -0.037** -0.044*** 
      
R squared 0.7306 0.7310 0.7777 0.7595 0.7737 
F-statistics 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No of observations 61 61 48 48 48 
Hansen test (p-val) 
H0: Instruments are valid 
0.1277 0.1097 0.1114 0.2847 0.2507 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-age level, respectively. 
 
 Having evidenced that inflation targeters on average performed worse than non-inflation 
targeters post-communist economies, leads to the next question – whether their ‘condition’ to pursue 
inflation targeting may have affected this result. Namely, some (e.g. Carvalho Filho, 2010) argue that 
inflation targeting may perform well in good times even if some of the pre-conditions for its 
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pursuance are not fulfilled. However, this may not be true under non-normal circumstances, especially 
for developing ecoomies. We check for this in turn. 
 
5.2. Does pre-conditions fulfillment matter? 
Table 4 gives the results of regression (2), i.e. when four variables approximating the four 
pre-conditions for successful inflation targeting in post-communist economies are included. Columns 
(1)-(4) give the results for each pre-condition separately, while column (5) treats them together. 
According to the diagnostics, all regressions are well specified; also, sufficiently large variation of the 
growth decline during crisis is explained by the regressors, as judged by the coefficient of 
determination. The coefficients of the basic specification remain robust to this treatment. Results 
suggest that only one of the conditions matters for how inflation targeters coped with the crisis – the 
amount of monetary financing of the budget. It shows limited statistical significance both in column 
(1) and in (5), suggesting that inflation targeters who had less monetary financing of the budget, 
experienced on average lower growth decline. This is expected since, as explained in Section 3, 
having a large portion of the budget deficit being financed by the central bank, would jeopardize the 
achievement of the inflation target and may result in higher interest rates suffocating the economy, but 
not easing inflation. 
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Table 4 – Testing the role of preconditions (IV-RE) 
Dependent variable: 
Current growth minus 
average 2006:Q1-2012:Q1 
Precondition 
1 
Precondition 
2 
Precondition 
3 
Precondition 
4 
All 
preconditions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real money growth 0.297*** 0.280*** 0.264*** 0.275*** 0.284*** 
Interest rate -0.009** -0.009*** -0.010** -0.009*** -0.006* 
Change in the real effective 
exchange rate 
0.116* 0.097 0.125 0.099 0.139* 
Real growth of government 
consumption 
0.154 0.237 0.461 0.190 0.286 
Trade openness 0.105 0.261* 0.354 0.223 0.100 
Capital flows to GDP -1.618 -0.867 2.620 -0.829 1.193 
Credit to GDP 0.129*** 0.105** 0.134* 0.098** 0.103* 
Inflation 0.490 0.410 0.885 0.436 1.110 
Constant -0.009 -0.013 -0.045 -0.005 -0.062 
      
Inflation targeting -0.025 -0.044** -0.041** 0.002 -0.171 
Pre-conditions 
Central bank financing of 
the budget under IT – a 
year before 
-0.936* - - - -0.878** 
Degree of euroization 
under IT – a year before 
- 0.016 - - 0.124 
Volatility of REER under 
IT – a year before 
- - -0.001 - -0.001 
Monetary transmission 
effectiveness under IT – a 
year before 
- - - -0.017 0.051 
Joint significance of the 
preconditions (p-val) 
- - - - 0.0295 
      
R squared 0.7755 0.7792 0.7445 0.7756 0.8094 
F-statistics 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No of observations 48 48 48 48 48 
Hansen test (p-val) 
H0: Instruments are valid 
0.3824 0.1934 0.2272 0.2469 0.1475 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-age level, respectively. 
 
Results suggest that a percentage point larger amount of monetary financing of the budget (as a share 
of M2) leads to additionally (to that of IT itself) larger growth decline by about 0.9 percentage points 
for inflation targeters, on average, ceteris paribus. In addition to the limited statistical significance, 
this result may be large, though. However, it may have two explanations: i) some inflation targeting 
central banks – like that of Hungary and Romania – reduced the monetary financing of the budget to a 
very low level (1.5% of M2 in 2011), while others – Czech, Poland and Serbia – do not have an 
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option to extend fresh money for budget purposes. Hence, this finding may matter little for those 
economies; and ii) other inflation targeters, though – Albania and Armenia –still have a two-digit 
level of their monetary financing for the budget and the large coefficient for them may signify that 
they can mitigate the risk for operating under IT in terms of the output losses the economy may incur 
under economic crisis, should they reduce the amount of monetary financing.  
 The insignificance of the other three preconditions is in line with Mishkin (2004), who argues 
that albeit in many cases these were far from being fulfilled, countries pursued successful IT; it is also 
in line with the findings of Leiderman et al. (2006) and Armas and Grippa (2006) who find no role for 
euroization in the IT economies of South America. Nevertheless, against the hesitant finding that only 
one precondition matters for short-run growth under IT during crisis, we find that the four pre-
conditions jointly have a statistically significant explanatory power on growth decline at the 5% level. 
One should not disregard this finding, given that the addition of extra variables in the regression may 
result in multicolinearity and hence render many important variables insignificant. So, from that 
viewpoint, euroization, external shocks and the effectiveness of monetary transmission may matter for 
successful IT in times of crisis for the growth in post-communist economies. However, this 
interpretation is tentative and should be approached with considerable caution. Though, coefficients 
signs are appropriate: more euroization supports crisis growth, probably because IT central banks in 
more euroized economies would intervene on the foreign exchange market more to prevent large 
swings in the exchange rate to adversely affect agents’ portfolios; by doing so, the central bank would 
prevent larger output volatility also. Higher volatility of the real effective exchange rate (reflecting the 
incidence of external shocks) would deepen growth decline, while better monetary transmission 
would ease growth under IT. 
 Overall, we find little evidence that the fulfillment of the preconditions for IT matters for how 
the IT economy would perform during the crisis. Very tentative evidence suggests that more monetary 
financing of the budget would result in larger output decline, but the finding may have limited 
importance due to the already low levels of the budget monetary financing in a larger part of the 
investigated economies. 
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6. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to investigate if inflation targeting post-communist economies 
performed better, in terms of the output growth, than their non-inflation targeting counterparts during 
the ongoing economic crisis. The paper also puts emphasis on the preconditions for pursuing inflation 
targeting and their potential role in those economies during the crisis. 26 post-communist economies 
from Central and South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States have been 
analyzed over the period 2009:Q1-2012:Q1, which coincides with the duration of the economic crisis. 
The growth decline, measured as a difference between actual growth and the average for the period 
2006-2012, is regressed on a set of variables measuring monetary and fiscal policy, external 
vulnerability and buffer variables. Then, a dummy variable is added for inflation targeters so as to 
measure if and to what extent they differed in terms of growth decline during the crisis. 
Results suggest that countries which had inflation targeting as their monetary strategy, during 
the crisis performed worse than non-inflation targeters, by about 4.4 percentage points, on average, 
ceteris paribus. Hence, results suggest that inflation targeting indeed does not suit a large 
macroeconomic shock as the ongoing crisis; the narrow focus of the framework on inflation may have 
blinded central bankers from other worthwhile objectives such as smoothing output fluctuations. 
When the question is put in the context of the preconditions for successful inflation targeting, the 
study finds little evidence that their fulfillment matters for how the economy performs during the 
crisis. Very tentative evidence suggests that only the lower amount of monetary financing of the 
budget may have contributed inflation-targeting countries to have gone through the crisis better, but 
the finding may have limited importance due to the already low levels of the budget monetary 
financing in the investigated economies. 
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